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ABSTRACT: 
In one of the first stand-alone studies covering the whole of the Indonesian 
banking industry, and utilising a unique dataset provided by the Indonesian central 
bank, this paper analyses the levels of intermediation-based efficiency obtaining 
during the period 2003-2007.  Using a new approach (i.e., semi-oriented radial 
measure Data Envelopment Analysis, or ‘SORM DEA’) to handling negative 
numbers (Emrouznejad et al., 2010) and combining it with Tone’s (2001) slacks-
based model (SBM) to form an input-oriented, non-parametric SORM SBM model, 
we firstly estimate the relative average efficiencies of Indonesian banks, both overall, 
by group, as determined by their ownership structure, and by status 
(‘listed’/’Islamic’).  For robustness, a range-directional (RD) model suggested by 
Silva Portela et al. (2004) was also employed to handle the negative numbers.  In the 
second part of the analysis, we adopt Simar and Wilson’s (2007) bootstrapping 
methodology to formally test for the impact of size, ownership structure and status on 
Indonesian bank efficiency.  In addition, we formally test the two models most widely 
suggested in the literature for controlling for bank risk – namely, those involving the 
inclusion of provisions for loan losses and equity capital respectively as inputs – to 
check the robustness of the results to the choice of risk variable. 
 The results demonstrate a high degree of sensitivity of the average bank 
efficiency scores to the choice of methodology for handling negative numbers – with 
the RD model consistently delivering efficiency scores some 14% on average above 
those from the SORM SBM model – and to the choice of risk control variable under 
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the RD model, but only a limited sensitivity to the choice of risk control variable 
under the SORM SBM model.  With respect to group rankings, most model 
combinations find the ‘state-owned’ group to be the most efficient, with average 
overall efficiency levels ranging between 64% and 97%; while all model 
combinations find the ‘regional government-owned’ group to be the least efficient, 
with average overall efficiency levels ranging between 41% and 64%.  As for the 
impact of bank ‘status’ on the efficiency scores, both the Islamic banks and the listed 
banks perform better than the industry average in the majority of model combinations. 
 Finally, the results for the impact of scale on the efficiency scores are 
ambiguous.  Under the RD model, and irrespective of the choice of risk control 
variable, size is very important in determining intermediation-based efficiency.  
Under the SORM SBM model, however, large banks’ performance is not significantly 
different from that of the medium-sized banks when equity capital is used as the risk 
control variable, although the medium-sized banks do out-perform small banks.  
Moreover, when loan loss provisions are used as the risk control variable, medium-
sized banks are shown to significantly out-perform both large and small banks, with 
the large banks being the least efficient. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  C23; C52; G21 
Keywords:  Indonesian Finance and Banking; Efficiency. 
 
 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Empirical studies of bank efficiency have mushroomed in recent years as 
interest has spread beyond banking markets in North America and Western Europe 
and modelling methodologies have evolved to tackle the increasingly-complex nature 
of banking operations and their diverse operating environments.  On the modelling 
front, there is a schism between the proponents of parametric and non-parametric 
approaches to assessing bank efficiencies, while elsewhere debates rage about the 
appropriate form of the input/output specifications – the traditional ‘intermediation-
based’ approach versus the ‘production’ or ‘profit/revenue’ approaches (see Drake et 
al., 2009) – to be adopted, the merits of allowing for ‘slacks’ in non-parametric 
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modelling, the optimal orientation of the model (input versus output versus non-
oriented) and the best way to control for risk (for a recent literature review addressing 
all these issues see Fethi and Pasiouras, 2009).  Our personal preferences are as 
follows.  Firstly, we prefer to use DEA rather than stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
because it does not require any assumptions to be made about the distribution of the 
inefficiency nor require a particular functional form in the construction of the frontier.  
Secondly, we believe that, in this study, the intermediation approach rather than the 
production or profit/revenue approaches should be adopted because of the Indonesian 
banking industry’s state of development (i.e., it has moved beyond the basic level but 
is not as sophisticated as more mature Western systems fully engaged in derivatives 
markets, heavy involved in ‘structured’ products and widely diversified in off-balance 
sheet activities).  Thirdly, we favour an input-orientated model because we would 
argue that Indonesian bank managers are likely to have more control over inputs than 
outputs.  Fourthly, we prefer loan loss provisions to equity capital as the risk control 
variable on the grounds that the main risk facing Indonesian banks today is still credit 
risk, in part because of the restraining influence exercised by the banks’ regulator, 
Bank Indonesia, on the banks’ assumption of market, liquidity and other types of risk.  
As for the chosen approach for handling negative numbers, however – see below – we 
use a robustness check, in this case using equity capital instead of loan loss 
provisions.  And fifthly, we opt for Tone’s (2001) SBM, because standard DEA 
models based on the Banker et al (1984) specification fail to allow for additional 
potential input reductions (i.e., due to the existence of ‘non-radial input slacks’; see 
Fried et al, 1999).   
For these reasons, we choose to adopt a non-parametric approach to efficiency 
estimation (input-oriented Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)), based upon the 
intermediation activities of banks and accounting for output and input slacks.  
However, to handle the negative numbers in the data, we use, for the first time (as far 
as we are aware), the approach suggested by Emrouznejad et al (2010), but with a 
robustness check provided by the application of Silva Portela et al’s (2004) range-
directional approach.  This methodology is used to address the issue of how efficient 
Indonesian banks were during the period 2003 to 2007 and which type of banks (by 
ownership and status, that is, listed/non-listed, Islamic/conventional) were the most 
efficient.  Furthermore, the differences in efficiencies between different ownership, 
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status and asset-sized groups, were then formally tested using the bootstrapping 
procedures of Simar and Wilson (2007). 
This paper represents one of the first attempts to analyse Indonesian banks on 
a stand-alone basis.  The analysis of banking markets in Indonesia is long overdue 
given the country’s growing importance within the resurgent region of South East 
Asia and its significance as a major ASEAN nation.  Moreover, it is one of only a few 
studies to analyse bank efficiency in this region since the end of the Asian financial 
crisis (1997/98).  Accordingly, it represents a timely and warranted addition to the 
extant empirical literature on banking efficiency, especially for the South East Asian 
region. 
The paper is structured as follows.  In Section 2, we briefly set out the 
structure of the Indonesian banking system, highlighting the respective asset and 
deposit shares of the different groups.  In Section 3 we present the modelling 
methodology, the nature of the dataset used, and the input/output variables deployed 
in the intermediation-based efficiency analysis.  In Section 4 we set out our results, 
and explain their policy implications.  And, in Section 5, we summarise and conclude. 
 
 
2.  THE INDONESIAN BANKING INDUSTRY: A BRIEF STRUCTURAL 
REVIEW 
 
 As shown in Table 1, at the end of 2007 there were 130 banks operating in 
Indonesia with a combined balance sheet of over IDR 1,986 trillion (US$ 213 billion).  
This comprised 5 state-owned banks, 35 foreign exchange private banks, 36 non-
foreign exchange private banks, 26 regional government-owned banks, 17 joint-
venture banks and 11 foreign banks.  This number compares with a total of 222 banks 
which were in existence at the end of December 1997 and reflects a post-Asian 
financial crisis policy of consolidation through liquidation and suspension, as agreed 
with the IMF following the country’s bailout (see Jao, 2001, Chapter 2), and more 
recently, though officially-encouraged mergers.  The asset shares of the various 
groups are highlighted in Table 1 and their deposit shares in Figure 1. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 AND FIGURE 1 
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 Since the Asian financial crisis (AFC) in 1997/98, Indonesia has seen a 
complete transformation of its financial services industry compared with that which 
operated under the General Soeharto regime.  The AFC saw Indonesia sign a ‘Letter 
of Intent’ on 13th October 1997 with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reform 
the banking system and its operations and supervision.  The country pledged that 
“insolvent banks have been closed and weak, but viable, institutions have been 
required to formulate and implement rehabilitation plans.  At the same time, steps are 
being taken to minimize future systemic risks.  In particular, the legal and regulatory 
environment will be strengthened by establishing strong enforcement mechanisms and 
introducing a stringent exit policy,” (‘Letter of Intent’ paragraph 24, Indonesia, 
http://www.imf.org/external/country/idn/).  However, given the problems surrounding 
the financial crisis, where Indonesia was the worst affected (see Jao, 2001, Chapter 2), 
there was no quick solution to overcoming the country’s inherent internal problems 
(Sato, 2005). 
 While the IMF was supervising the transformation of the Indonesian financial 
system up to 2003, the Indonesian government introduced the Central Bank Act (Act 
No. 23) of 1999, which gave independence to Bank Indonesia.  This was then 
superseded by the 2004 amendment to the Central Bank Act of 1999 which enhanced 
the representation of and supervision by government officials, and reintroduced Bank 
Indonesia’s status as ‘lender of last resort’.  Since then, the evolution of supervision 
and regulation has continued, embracing, inter alia, the introduction of deposit 
guarantees and the establishment of a Financial Stability Net (involving Bank 
Indonesia, the Ministry of Finance and the Deposit Guarantee Agency (LPS)) in 
March 2007.   
 The latter developments are consistent with the aim of Bank Indonesia to see a 
more stable banking environment by reducing the number of banks in the country.  
This was implemented in three different ways.  The first was that banks must have a 
minimum Tier I capitalisation of Rp 80 billion (US$ 8.81 billion) by 2007, increasing 
to Rp 100 billion (US$10.2 billion) by 2010; hence, many small private banks would 
be priced out of the market and would have to merge.1  Secondly, in June 2006, Bank 
Indonesia introduced the ‘single presence policy’ that prohibits investors from holding 
                                            
1
  The rise in the Tier I minimum capital requirement is due to the central bank’s feeling that, presently, 
50 out of the 130 banks operating in Indonesia are too small and hence mergers are the only viable 
option to ensure the future stability of the financial system.  
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more than 25% of the shares of more than one bank.  This creates problems, not only 
for multiple holdings by foreign investors but also for the government itself, which 
owns stakes in five of the country’s largest banks, including Bank Mandiri, Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia and Bank Negara Indonesia.  It is hoped that the ‘single presence 
policy’ will lead to further consolidation within the industry in the coming years.  
Finally, the Financial Stability Net, introduced in 2007, saw a reduction in the 
depositor guarantee level from Rp 2 billion to Rp 100 million (US$11,000), which 
covers 98% of all depositors and 38% of deposits.  Given the increased risk of holding 
cash in banks in excess of the deposit guarantee level it is hoped that investors will be 
more selective in their choice of bank, leading to a natural consolidation in the 
financial services industry in Indonesia. 
 In summary, the changes outlined above and set in train by Bank Indonesia 
allowed the banks to put many of their previous problems behind them and 
contributed towards increased financial stability in Indonesia.  Hence, the period 2003 
to 2007 is an ideal era in which to analyse the evolution of Indonesian bank efficiency 
post-AFC.  We next discuss the data and methodology used to estimate the 
efficiencies across the different sectors of the Indonesian banking system. 
 
 
3.  DATA AND MODELLING METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.  Estimation of Efficiency 
 
Estimation of a bank’s level of efficiency involves a comparison of its actual 
and best possible performances, given the inputs and outputs specified.  In this study, 
we focus on input-reduction strategies and evaluate input-oriented efficiency 
measures estimating by how much banks could reduce the usage of their resources 
(inputs) given the outputs they produce.  Formally, the optimum level of inputs is 
given by the relevant frontier which represents the common technology T  banks use 
to transform inputs X (m × n) into outputs Y (s × n), given by equation (1): 
 
    { }YproducecanX|)Y,X(T = .   (1) 
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However, given that the true frontier is not observable, it can be approximated 
by a ‘best-practice’ frontier, in which the literature has posited two estimation 
approaches, the non-parametric and parametric methodologies.  The former approach 
is based on mathematical programming and the latter makes use of econometric 
estimation techniques.  The main advantage of the non-parametric technique is that it 
does not assume any functional form in the construction of the frontier, unlike its 
parametric counterparts (for further discussion, see Coelli et al. 2005).  In this paper, 
we therefore utilise the non-parametric linear programming technique, DEA, which 
originated from Farrell’s (1957) seminal work and was later extended by Charnes et 
al., (1978), Banker et al. (1984) and Färe et al. (1985), to estimate the frontier.  In 
addition, the individual input-oriented efficiency for each bank is computed relative to 
the estimated frontier by solving the model based on semi-oriented methodology 
suggested by Emrouznejad et al., 2010 and Tone’s (2001) slacks-based measure.  The 
‘SORM SBM’ efficiency estimator duly accounts for negative data in an original 
way2 and also takes into account the slacks of resources arising in a bank’s 
production, in recognition of Fried et al’s (1999) critique of standard DEA techniques.   
We thus use the following formula to estimate the efficiency scores: 
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where the negative outputs of banking production (e.g., in the profit/loss accounts) 1sjY  
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2
  Alternative ways to deal with negative data in construction of the non-parametric DEA frontier are: 
to transform (i.e., ‘translate’) the data, adding a sufficiently large scalar to the data (Ali and Seiford, 
1990; Pastor, 1996); to treat absolute negative inputs or outputs as output or input respectively (Scheel, 
2001); or to use range directional measures (Silva Portela et al, 2004; Sharp et al, 2006).  Our 
preference, in part because it allows for the use of the data directly but also because it has never been 
used before, is for Emrouznejad et al’s (2010) SORM approach, but Silva Portela et al’s (2004) range - 
directional measure is used a robustness check in recognition of the novelty of the approach adopted – 
see below. 
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Formula (2) estimates non-radial efficiency scores, i.e. it allows banks to 
minimise resources in different proportions. Most of the traditional input-oriented 
models for efficiency estimation assume radial contraction of the resources. For a 
robustness check of our model, we also perform the range-directional model (RD) 
suggested by Silva Portela et al (2004): 
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In formula (3), { }ijioio xxR min−=  is a range directional vector and captures all 
possible reductions of bank o’s resources.     
Finally, to test which bank-specific factors have an impact on banking 
efficiency, in the second stage of this analysis the efficiency measures jρˆ , estimated 
using programs (2) or (3), are regressed on jz , a set of explanatory variables such as 
ownership, status and size dummy variables.  The specification of the truncated 
regression used in this study is as follows:  
 
    
1z0 jjj ≤ε+β+α=ρ≤     (4) 
 
where β is a vector of parameters associated with each factor to be estimated.  The 
distribution of the error term jε  is assumed to be truncated normal with zero mean 
and unknown variance.  The left and right truncation points of the s'jε  distribution 
are )z( jβ−  and )z1( jβ−  respectively (for further details on the bootstrapping 
techniques utilised see Kenjegalieva et al., 2009). 
Finally, to evaluate the possible difference of efficiency scores obtained under 
the alternative methodologies of incorporating risk, namely using provisions for loan 
losses (LLP) or equity capital (EQ), we test the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: )EFF(F)EFF(F EQLLP ≠  – the distributions of efficiency scores are 
different under the two alternative model specifications i.e., efficiency scores are 
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sensitive to the choice of the variable capturing banking risk, against the null 
hypothesis, 
H0: )EFF(F)EFF(F EQLLP =  – the distribution of efficiency scores is the same 
under the two alternative model specifications i.e., the choice of the variable to 
capture banking risk  does not affect the efficiency scores. 
 
To test the above, Simar and Zelenyuk’s (2006) bootstrapped-based statistical 
tool for testing equality of distributions of unobserved but DEA-estimated efficiency 
scores based on a Li (1996) test is performed.  In addition, for density and inter-
density mobility analysis of efficiency scores, we also utilize the kernel density 
approach suggested by Tortosa-Ausina (2002a, 2002b). 
 
 
3.2.  Data and Input/Output Variables 
 
This paper utilises quarterly supervisory data from Bank Indonesia and covers 
the period 2003 – 2007.  In modelling the intermediation approach, we specify three 
outputs and four inputs, in line with Sealey and Lindley (1977) – see Table 2 for the 
summary statistics.  The first output is ‘total loans’ (total customer loans), the second 
output is ‘other earning assets’ (placements in Bank of Indonesia + interbank assets + 
securities held + other claims + equity participation + cash), and the third output is 
‘net total off-balance-sheet income’ (net income from 
dividends/fees/commissions/provisions + net income from forex/derivative 
transactions + (securities appreciation - securities depreciation) – insurance expenses 
– capital market transactions).  The third output variable set is included to proxy the 
non-traditional business activities of Indonesian banks. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
The inputs estimated in the intermediation approach are: ‘total consumer 
deposits and commercial borrowing’ (demand deposits + saving deposits + time 
deposits + liabilities to Bank of Indonesia + inter-bank liabilities + securities issued + 
borrowings + other payables + guarantee deposits + inter office liabilities); ‘total 
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employee expenses’ (total salaries and wages + total educational spending); and ‘total 
non-employee expenses’ (R & D + rent + promotion + repair and maintenance + 
goods and services + other costs).  We also use ‘total provisions’ (allowances for loan 
losses) in Model 1 and ‘Equity Capital’ in Model 2 as risk control variables, as 
discussed above.  With respect to this input variable, it has long been argued in the 
literature that the incorporation of risk/loan quality is vitally important in studies of 
banking efficiency (Altunbas et al, 2000; Drake and Hall, 2003).  While Akhigbe and 
McNulty (2003), for example, include equity capital “to control, in a very rough 
fashion, for the potential increased cost of funds due to financial risk” (page. 312), 
Laevan and Majnoni (2003) argue that risk should be incorporated into efficiency 
studies via the inclusion of loan loss provisions.  Although, as agued earlier, we 
favour the use of loan loss provisions in this study as the risk control variable, we run 
both models in recognition of the schism in the literature. 
 
 
4.  RESULTS 
  
The non-parametric frontier constructed in this study represents the ‘best 
approximated’ frontier as it is based on the practices of all but one of the Indonesian 
banks operating in 2003 - 2007.  The average efficiency scores across the different 
types of banks, estimated for both models (i.e., using SORM SBM and RD), are given 
in Tables 3 and 4. 3 
 
INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 
 
 As can be seen from the two tables, the estimated efficiency scores are very 
sensitive to the choice of methodology for handling negative numbers (i.e., SORM 
SBM or RD) – see also Figure 2 – the latter delivering overall scores, on average 
across the two models, some 14% higher than the former.  In part, this is due to the 
fact that, by construction, the SBM efficiency scores must be less than or equal to the 
efficiency scores resulting from the non SBM-based range-directional model (see 
                                            
3
 To put the average efficiency scores into an international perspective, the industry average of around 
60% under the SORM SBM model compares with an industry average of 71% for Japanese banks in 
2002 under another study of South East Asian bank efficiency using the SBM/intermediation approach  
and loan loss provisions as the risk control variable (see Drake et al., 2009, Table 2). 
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Tone, 2001).  Furthermore, group rankings appear somewhat sensitive to both the 
choice of modelling methodology and the choice of risk control variable, although 
most model combinations have the ‘state-owned’ banks amongst the most efficient, 
with all models showing the ‘regional government-owned’ grouping as the least 
efficient – see also Table 5. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 AND TABLE 5 
 
Similarly, the sensitivity of the SORM SBM and RD overall results to the 
choice of risk control variable appears somewhat low, although formal statistical tests 
(see Table 6) demonstrate that, under the RD model at least, the sensitivity is in fact 
extremely high as the null hypothesis that the efficiency scores have common 
distributions is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
 
 Looking at the results in more detail, we can see that average bank efficiency 
within the industry during the analysed period lay between 58% and 63% for the 
SORM SBM model, and between 72% and 79% for the RD model.  The efficiency 
scores were higher, but only marginally, when equity capital is used as the risk control 
variable within the SORM SBM model, but marginally lower within the RD model.  
As for the group rankings, under the RD model, the most efficient group of banks was 
the ‘state-owned’ group, recording an average efficiency of over 90% regardless of 
the choice of risk control variable; while the least efficient group of banks, recording 
an average efficiency score of around 63%, was the ‘regional government-owned’ 
group.  The latter group also fared the worst under the SORM SBM model, with an 
average efficiency of around 45%, although the best-performing groups were the 
‘non-foreign exchange private’ banks and ‘foreign’ banks, recording virtually 
identical average scores (75%) when equity capital is used as the risk control variable, 
and average scores of 79% and 64% respectively when loan loss provisions are used 
as the risk control variable. 
 As for the impact of ‘status’ rather than ‘ownership structure’ on the average 
efficiency scores, listed banks were shown to be more efficient (with average 
efficiency levels of around 80%) than the average bank (around 75%) under the RD 
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model but not under the SORM SBM model, where their average efficiency score of 
around 57% was marginally less than that of the average bank, at around 61%.  
Meanwhile, Islamic banks were shown to have enjoyed overall efficiency levels of 
around 80% under the RD model, but only around 54% under the SORM SBM model. 
 With respect to the bootstrapping results, the rankings presented in Table 5 are 
largely supported.  For example, under the RD model when using loan loss provisions 
as the risk control variable, the ranking of the groups in descending order of 
performance is: ‘state-owned’ banks (used as the control group); ‘non-foreign 
exchange’ banks; ‘joint venture’ banks; ‘foreign-exchange’ banks; ‘regional 
government-owned’ banks; and ‘foreign’ banks – see Table 7.  Moreover, this ranking 
is significant at the 1% significance level.  Similarly, again mainly at the 1% 
significance level, ‘foreign’ banks are shown to be the most significant group 
followed by, in descending order of performance, ‘state-owned’ banks, ‘joint venture’ 
banks, ‘non-foreign exchange’ banks, ‘foreign exchange’ banks, and ‘regional 
government-owned’ banks, when equity is used as the risk control variable (see Table 
8).  Under the SORM SBM model, ‘state-owned’ banks again come out on top with 
the ‘regional government-owned’ group performing the worst when loan loss 
provisions act as the risk control variable – see Table 9.  While, when equity capital is 
used as the risk control variable, ‘foreign’ banks emerge as the best performers, with, 
once again, the ‘regional government-owned’ group emerging as the worst performer 
– see Table 10.  These results confirm the earlier finding that, in general, the ‘state-
owned’ group are the most efficient with the ‘regional government-owned’ the least 
efficient.  
 
INSERT TABLES 7, 8, 9 and 10 
 
 Turning to the impact of ‘status’ on the efficiency scores, the results reveal 
that ‘listed’ banks are shown to perform better than the industry average in all but one 
of the model combinations i.e., when loan loss provisions act as the risk control 
variable under the RD model.  Likewise, the ‘Islamic’ banks perform better than the 
industry average in all bar one scenario i.e., when equity capital is used as the proxy 
for risk under the SORM SBM model.   
 In relation to the impact of size, the results are ambiguous.  Under the RD 
model, for example, and irrespective of the choice of risk control variable, large banks 
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are shown to out-perform medium-sized banks (used as the control group) which, in 
turn, out-perform small banks, all with 99% certainty (see Tables 7 and 8).  Under the 
SORM SBM model, however, large banks’ performance is not significantly different 
from that of the medium-sized banks when equity capital is used as the risk control 
variable, although medium-sized banks are shown, but only at the 10% significance 
level, to out-perform small banks (see Table 10).  Moreover, when loan provisions act 
as the risk control variable, medium-sized banks are shown to out-perform both large 
and small banks, with the large banks being the least efficient, again all at the 1% 
significance level. 
Finally, in respect of the kernel-density analysis, the differences between the 
efficiency distributions arising from the risk modelling methodologies and 
performance measurement models are shown in Figure 3.  The most significant 
discrepancy in the densities of efficiency scores reported by the different risk 
modelling approaches is observed in the RD models.  This divergence is visible not 
only in the shape of the densities, but also in their modes and modality.  For example, 
in the case of RD efficiency estimation, multi-modality exists in the density of the 
LLP efficiency scores in 2005 and 2007, and more moderately in the density of EQ in 
2003 and 2006. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
 
Although the shape of the densities of efficiency scores estimated by different 
approaches is fairly different, the estimated modes are roughly at the same level 
across the efficiency measuring models with RD being an exception in 2005-2007.  
As distribution analysis suggests, the efficiency scores calculated by different risk 
modelling specifications are more stable across the SORM SBM efficiency evaluation 
method.  This is in line with the results of the equality test of efficiency scores using 
Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted-Li test for equality of efficiency distributions (see Table 6). 
However, the analysis of the distribution of efficiency scores does not provide 
any information about the banks' relative positions, therefore the stochastic kernel 
density analysis of normalised efficiency scores are visualised.  Figure 4 displays 
stochastic distributions of the LLP and EQ risk modelling across the SORM SBM and 
RD methods of calculating efficiency.  As seen from Figure 4, the probability mass in 
SORM SBM models is concentrated along the diagonal line but widely spread.  On 
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the other hand, the probability mass for RD somewhat ignores the diagonal line but is 
more narrowly positioned.  These results suggest that the banks with efficiency scores 
close to the probability mode tend not to change their relative position when different 
risk modelling is used in the SORM SBM approach.  In the case of RD approach, 
however, banks with efficiency scores close to the mode tend to slightly change their 
relative positions. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 
 
 Unfortunately, neither of the existing published bank efficiency studies 
involving Indonesia are strictly suitable for comparative purposes as they both use 
SFA flexible Fourier methodologies for different periods.  Nevertheless, some 
comparisons are informative.  For example, in Margono et al’s (2009) study of 
Indonesian bank cost efficiency for the period 1993-2000, which, like us, used an 
intermediation-based production process but made no attempt to control for risk, the 
authors found that the ‘joint venture’ and ‘foreign’ banks were the most cost efficient, 
with small provincial local ‘government-owned’ banks being the least efficient 
grouping.  The latter finding is consistent with ours, suggesting that the ‘regional 
government-owned’ bank grouping has not improved its relative efficiency 
performance since 2000.  The former finding, however, stands in contrast to ours as, 
in our study, ‘foreign’ banks are found to be the most efficient (along with ‘state-
owned’ banks) only under the RD model when equity capital is used as the risk 
control variable.  Otherwise, they perform little better than the industry average.  
Similarly, in our model, ‘joint venture’ banks do not perform significantly better than 
the industry average under either the SORM SBM or RD models.  Another of 
Margono et al’s (2009) findings is that medium-sized banks’ cost efficiencies 
exceeded that of both large and small banks.  This is consistent with our findings 
under the SORM SBM model when loan loss provisions act as the risk control 
variable but otherwise not.  For example, under the RD model, and irrespective of the 
choice of risk control variable, large banks significantly out-perform medium-sized 
banks which, in turn, significantly out-perform small banks. 
 The second paper touching upon Indonesian bank efficiency is that of 
Williams and Nguyen (2005), which, like us, adopted an intermediation-based 
production approach and also controlled for various types of bank risk when 
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examining the profit efficiency of Indonesia’s banks over the period 1990-2003.  The 
only finding of relevance for our study, however, is that increased foreign ownership 
did not lead to a long term improvement in profit efficiency.  While our study does 
not correlate the degree of foreign ownership with efficiency scores the implied 
finding that foreign banks are not typically the best performers in the Indonesian 
banking sector is consistent with our own findings, where ‘foreign’ banks are the best 
performers only under the RD model when equity capital is used as the risk control 
variable. 
 
 
5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Using a unique dataset provided by Bank Indonesia and adopting input-
oriented SBM (Tone, 2001) and SORM (Emrouznejad et al., 2010) DEA 
intermediation-based approaches, we have estimated the average efficiencies of 
Indonesian banks during the 2003 to 2007 period, both overall and by group, as 
determined by size and status.  We also employed Silva Portela et al’s (2004) range-
directional (RD) model as a robustness check.  The stage one results demonstrate the 
following: (i) average bank efficiency within the industry during the analysed period 
lay between 58% and 63% for the SORM SBM model, and between 72% and 79% for 
the RD model, with the efficiency scores being higher, but only marginally, when 
equity capital is used as the risk control variable within the SORM SBM model but 
marginally lower within the RD model; (ii) under the RD model, the most efficient 
group of banks was the ‘state-owned’ group recording an average efficiency of over 
90%; (iii) under the SORM SBM model, the most efficient group of banks when LLP 
was used as the risk control variable was the ‘non-foreign exchange private banks’ 
group, with an average efficiency score of 79%, but when equity capital was used as 
the risk control variable, the ‘non-foreign exchange’ and ‘state-owned’ banks 
performed the best (74%); (iv) the ‘regional government-owned’ banks were shown to 
be the least efficient in both models – worryingly given that they have the 3rd largest 
share (9% at 1.1.08) of customer deposits – recording average efficiency levels of 
between 39% and 66%; (v) listed banks, were shown to be more efficient (with 
average efficiency levels of around 80%), than the average bank under the RD model 
but not under the SORM SBM model; and (vii) despite their very different operational 
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structure when compared with conventional banks, Islamic banks were shown to have 
enjoyed average levels of efficiency of between 45% and 61% under the SORM SBM 
model, and between 62% and 90% for the RD model. 
 These results suggest that the estimated efficiency scores are very sensitive to 
the choice of methodology used for dealing with negative numbers (i.e., SORM SBM 
or RD), the latter delivering scores, on average, 14% higher than the former.  They 
also suggest that group rankings are somewhat sensitive to the choice of risk control 
variable, although most models have the ‘state-owned’ banks amongst the most 
efficient, with all models showing the ‘regional government-owned’ banks as the least 
efficient.  Formal statistical tests confirm that the results are, in fact, very sensitive to 
the choice of risk control variable under the RD model but less so under the SORM 
SBM model. 
 The bootstrapping results largely confirm the group rankings derived in the 
first part of the analysis, as well as the relative performances of the ‘Islamic’ and 
‘listed’ banks.  Moreover, the results for the impact of scale are ambiguous, with the 
largest banks only emerging as the most efficient in the RD model.   
 As for the main policy implications of our study, firstly, given that they have 
the third greatest share of assets and customer deposits yet are the most inefficient 
group, supervisory resources should be devoted to trying to understand why the 
regional government-owned banks’ intermediation-based activities are so inefficient 
with a view to raising their performance to at least the industry average.  Although, in 
all likelihood, the answer mainly lies in their continued susceptibility to ‘directed 
lending’ by their political masters (and hence subject to social policy/political 
requirements rather than to cost-minimisation considerations) there may be other 
factors at play.  Secondly, closer analysis of the operations of the state-owned banks 
might be undertaken with a view to eliciting “best industry practice” and 
disseminating such findings to the rest of the industry.  [The ‘state-owned’ banks are 
likely to have benefitted from ‘cleansing’ of their balance sheets prior to privatisation 
to enhance the demand for their shares.]  And, finally, close inspection of the relative 
efficiency rankings might also be used to inform the continuing debate on bank 
mergers by identifying those tie-ups which are likely to prove most beneficial, 
whether they arise as a result of private sector initiatives or from officially-sanctioned 
‘assisted mergers’, a common feature of banking markets around the world as 
regulators seek to stabilise their financial systems in the wake of the sub-prime crisis 
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and the global economic downturn.  The empirical finding that large banks are 
significantly more efficient than their smaller counterparts in the RD model offers 
some support to Bank Indonesia’s efforts, to date, to force further consolidation in the 
Indonesian banking sector, although, of course, increased efficiency need not 
necessarily equate to increased stability, as evidenced by the liquidity crisis which 
faced the British bank Northern Rock in the Autumn of 2007 despite the bank 
possessing an industry-beating cost-to-income ratio (see House of Commons, 2008). 
 The findings therefore suggest a future Indonesian bank efficiency research 
agenda embracing formal analysis of the potential gains to be made from further 
mergers in the banking industry.  In addition, it would be informative to examine the 
impact of external and regulatory factors on the evolution of the Indonesian banking 
industry since before the AFC and to compare industry performance with that of other 
ASEAN banking systems.  Our future efforts, accordingly, will be focused in these 
areas.   
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Table 2. 
Summary statistics for Indonesian banks’ Inputs and Outputs in IDR tn. 
(Quarter 1 2003 – Quarter 4 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
The Structure of the Indonesian Banking Industry at end-December 2007 
 
Type of Bank* Number of 
Banks 
Total Assets 
(IDR tn.) 
Total Assets 
Share (%) 
State-owned banks 5 742.0 36% 
Foreign exchange private 
national banks 35 768.7 39% 
Non-foreign exchange 
private national banks 36 39.0 2% 
Regional government-
owned banks 26 170.0 9% 
Joint venture banks 17 90.5 5% 
Foreign banks (branching) 11 176.3 9% 
Total 130 1986.5 100% 
 
Note. *From amongst this group of 130 banks, there are 24 listed banks, comprising 17 foreign 
exchange private banks, 2 non- foreign exchange private banks, a regional government-owned 
bank, a joint  venture bank, and 3  state-owned banks. As well as this, there are 3 Islamic 
banks, which comprise two foreign exchange private banks and a non- foreign exchange 
private bank.  
 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Std.Dev. 
Inputs     
Total consumer deposits and 
commercial borrowing 
(Models 1 and 2) 7368357 66 231144394 21658734 
Total employee expenses 
(Models 1 and 2) 33827 247 1200971 103131 
Total non-employee expenses 
(Model 1s and 2) 31361 81 2239957 93190 
Total provisions 
(Model 1) 273071 51 11682029 1115930 
Equity capital 
(Model 2) 466468 196 30791531 1490615 
Outputs     
Total loans 
(Models 1 and 2) 3690420 0 79290094 9637662 
Total other earning assets 
(Models 1 and 2) 6672744 2508 345617374 25140750 
Net total off-balance sheet 
income 
 (Models 1 and 2) 23255 -1750422 11151124 238208 
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Table 3. 
Average efficiency results for Indonesian banks (Model 1 – Loan Loss Provisions (LLP) as a proxy for risk) 
     
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 
  
SORM 
SBM RD 
SORM 
SBM RD 
SORM 
SBM RD 
SORM 
SBM RD 
SORM 
SBM RD 
SORM 
SBM RD 
Bank Status             
Listed banks  0.539 0.801 0.541 0.802 0.554 0.834 0.521 0.830 0.544 0.843 0.540 0.822 
Islamic banks  0.535 0.816 0.600 0.889 0.575 0.878 0.558 0.901 0.539 0.868 0.561 0.871 
Ownership Status 
Groups    
 
        
State- Owned  0.703 0.973 0.705 0.962 0.552 0.969 0.587 0.956 0.639 0.983 0.638 0.969 
Foreign Exchange 
Private Banks  0.500 0.721 0.482 0.737 0.533 0.784 0.517 0.802 0.543 0.807 0.515 0.770 
Non-Foreign Exchange 
Private Banks  0.793 0.792 0.749 0.791 0.787 0.811 0.813 0.813 0.801 0.804 0.788 0.802 
Regional Government-
Owned banks  0.393 0.582 0.416 0.639 0.413 0.645 0.411 0.629 0.422 0.660 0.411 0.631 
Joint Venture Banks  0.647 0.801 0.627 0.805 0.615 0.821 0.596 0.821 0.625 0.860 0.623 0.820 
Foreign Banks  0.475 0.703 0.504 0.715 0.543 0.764 0.588 0.812 0.559 0.821 0.534 0.763 
 
   
 
        
Overall Banking 
Industry  0.593 0.735 0.577 0.750 0.594 0.775 0.598 0.780 0.606 0.791 0.593 0.766 
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Table 4. 
Average efficiency results for Indonesian banks (Model 2 – Equity Capital (EQ) as a proxy for risk) 
     
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 
  
SORM 
SBM RD 
SORM 
SBM RD 
SORM 
SBM RD 
SORM 
SBM RD 
SORM 
SBM RD 
SORM 
SBM RD 
Bank Status             
Listed banks  0.599 0.789 0.576 0.803 0.592 0.823 0.617 0.798 0.603 0.799 0.597 0.802 
Islamic banks  0.448 0.622 0.565 0.720 0.606 0.741 0.560 0.820 0.487 0.839 0.533 0.749 
Ownership Status 
Groups    
 
        
State- Owned  0.755 0.962 0.754 0.948 0.695 0.945 0.779 0.943 0.731 0.959 0.743 0.952 
Foreign Exchange 
Private Banks  0.534 0.700 0.545 0.714 0.577 0.741 0.579 0.731 0.582 0.729 0.563 0.723 
Non-Foreign Exchange 
Private Banks  0.740 0.699 0.726 0.706 0.741 0.714 0.766 0.712 0.753 0.716 0.745 0.709 
Regional Government-
Owned banks  0.529 0.614 0.492 0.642 0.493 0.648 0.459 0.634 0.482 0.645 0.491 0.636 
Joint Venture Banks  0.607 0.762 0.596 0.773 0.646 0.794 0.638 0.765 0.597 0.801 0.616 0.778 
Foreign Banks  0.630 0.942 0.648 0.946 0.734 0.951 0.705 0.964 0.758 0.959 0.695 0.953 
 
   
 
        
Overall Banking 
Industry  0.619 0.720 0.610 0.732 0.633 0.746 0.633 0.737 0.630 0.744 0.625 0.736 
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Table 6 
Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted-Li test for equality of efficiency distributions 
 
SORM SBM RD Null Hypothesis: 
f(effLLP)=f(effEQ) Test 
statistics 
Bootstrap p-
value 
Test 
statistics 
Bootstrap p-
value 
2003 2.2610* 0.0170 8.2779* 0.0000 
2004 0.7528 0.2165 1.9319* 0.0315 
2005 1.3692** 0.0525 4.4211* 0.0010 
2006 2.2180* 0.0120 11.0239* 0.0000 
2007 0.7042 0.2330 10.1257* 0.0000 
 
Notes: The number of bootstrap iterations is 2000. For these tests, we use the Gaussian density and h is the 
minimum of the two bandwidths for EFFLLP and EFFEC, which are calculated according to Silverman (1986). 
α=5%. Statistical significance: * statistically significant at 5% level, ** statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Sensitivity of Group Efficiency Rankings to Choice of Modelling Methodology. 
 
 SORM SBM RD 
 Risk Control Variable Risk Control Variable 
Rank LLP EQ LLP EQ 
1 Non-foreign 
exchange private 
banks (79%) 
Non-foreign 
exchange private 
banks (75%) 
State-owned banks 
(97%) 
State-owned banks 
(95%) 
Foreign banks 
(95%) 
2 State-owned banks 
(64%) 
State-owned banks 
(74%) 
Joint venture banks 
(82%) - -  
3 Joint venture banks 
(62%) 
Foreign banks 
(70%) 
Non-foreign 
exchange private 
banks (80%) 
Joint venture banks 
(78%) 
4 Foreign banks 
(53%) 
Joint venture banks 
(62%) 
Foreign-exchange 
private banks 
(77%) 
Foreign-exchange 
private banks 
(72%) 
5 Foreign-exchange 
private banks 
(52%) 
Foreign-exchange 
private banks 
(56%) 
Foreign banks 
(76%) 
Non-foreign 
exchange private 
banks (71%) 
6 Regional 
government-owned 
banks (41%) 
Regional 
government-owned 
banks (49%) 
Regional 
government-owned 
banks (63%) 
Regional 
government-owned 
banks (64%) 
Industry 
average 59% 63% 77% 74% 
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Table 7 
Results of the truncated regression with two truncations: RD input-oriented efficiency 
measures (Model 1 – LLP as a proxy for risk) 
Bounds of the Bootstrap Est.  Confidence Intervals  
Est. Coef. 5% low 5% up 1% low 1% up 10% low 10% up 
Listed -0.021*** -0.046 0.004 -0.054 0.012 -0.042 -0.0001 
Islamic 0.202* 0.135 0.267 0.114 0.288 0.145 0.257 
Foreign 
Exchange -0.456* -0.589 -0.323 -0.631 -0.281 -0.568 -0.344 
Non-
Foreign 
Exchange 
-0.318* -0.452 -0.184 -0.494 -0.142 -0.430 -0.205 
Regional 
Government 
Owned 
-0.560* -0.694 -0.426 -0.737 -0.383 -0.673 -0.447 
Joint-
Venture -0.346* -0.480 -0.211 -0.522 -0.169 -0.458 -0.232 
Foreign -0.537* -0.671 -0.401 -0.714 -0.358 -0.650 -0.423 
Small  -0.061* -0.080 -0.041 -0.086 -0.034 -0.077 -0.044 
Large 0.216* 0.183 0.249 0.173 0.259 0.189 0.243 
Constant 1.195* 1.061 1.329 1.019 1.371 1.082 1.308 
εσˆ  0.157* 0.150 0.163 0.148 0.165 0.151 0.162 
Notes: Statistical significance:* denotes statistically significant at the 1% level; ** denotes statistically 
significant at the 5% level; and  *** denotes statistically significant at the 10% level (according to the bootstrap 
confidence intervals). The α-% lower and upper bounds of confidence intervals represent a range within which 
the (100-α) percentile of bootstrapped coefficients lies. A bank is classified as “small” if its total customer 
deposits are less than IDR 500,000 tn., “medium” if total deposits range between IDR 500,000 tn. and 
10,000,000 tn., and “large” if total deposits exceed  IDR 10,000,000 tn. 
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Table 8 
Results of the truncated regression with two truncations: RD input-oriented efficiency 
measures (Model 2 – equity capital as a proxy for risk) 
Bounds of the Bootstrap Est.  Confidence Intervals  
Est. Coef. 5% low 5% up 1% low 1% up 10% low 10% up 
Listed 0.017*** -0.002 0.037 -0.008 0.043 0.0005 0.034 
Islamic 0.075* 0.037 0.112 0.025 0.124 0.043 0.106 
Foreign 
Exchange -0.286* -0.356 -0.214 -0.378 -0.192 -0.345 -0.226 
Non-
Foreign 
Exchange 
-0.191* -0.262 -0.119 -0.285 -0.096 -0.251 -0.130 
Regional 
Government 
Owned 
-0.316* -0.387 -0.244 -0.410 -0.222 -0.376 -0.256 
Joint-
Venture -0.170* -0.242 -0.098 -0.265 -0.075 -0.230 -0.109 
Foreign 0.091** 0.007 0.175 -0.018 0.201 0.020 0.161 
Small  -0.091* -0.106 -0.076 -0.111 -0.071 -0.104 -0.078 
Large 0.203* 0.176 0.230 0.167 0.238 0.180 0.226 
Constant 0.957* 0.886 1.028 0.864 1.050 0.897 1.016 
εσˆ  0.131* 0.126 0.136 0.125 0.137 0.127 0.134 
Notes: Statistical significance:* denotes statistically significant at the 1% level; ** denotes statistically 
significant at the 5% level; and  *** denotes statistically significant at the 10% level (according to the bootstrap 
confidence intervals). The α-% lower and upper bounds of confidence intervals represent a range within which 
the (100-α) percentile of bootstrapped coefficients lies. A bank is classified as “small” if its total customer 
deposits are less than IDR 500,000 tn., “medium” if total deposits range between IDR 500,000 tn. and 
10,000,000 tn., and “large” if total deposits exceed  IDR 10,000,000 tn. 
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Table 9 
Results of the truncated regression with two truncations: SORM SBM input-oriented 
efficiency measures  (Model 1 – LLP as a proxy for risk) 
Bounds of the Bootstrap Est.  Confidence Intervals  
Est. Coef. 5% low 5% up 1% low 1% up 10% low 10% up 
Listed 0.012 -0.003 0.028 -0.007 0.032 -0.0005 0.025 
Islamic 0.072* 0.042 0.101 0.033 0.110 0.046 0.096 
Foreign 
Exchange -0.123* -0.148 -0.097 -0.156 -0.088 -0.144 -0.101 
Non-
Foreign 
Exchange 
-0.079* -0.108 -0.050 -0.117 -0.040 -0.103 -0.054 
Regional 
Government 
Owned 
-0.203* -0.230 -0.175 -0.239 -0.166 -0.225 -0.179 
Joint-
Venture -0.016 -0.044 0.012 -0.053 0.021 -0.040 0.008 
Foreign -0.090* -0.119 -0.061 -0.128 -0.051 -0.115 -0.065 
Small  -0.029* -0.044 -0.013 -0.048 -0.009 -0.041 -0.016 
Large -0.040* -0.055 -0.023 -0.060 -0.018 -0.053 -0.026 
Constant 0.581* 0.554 0.607 0.546 0.615 0.559 0.603 
εσˆ  0.108* 0.104 0.111 0.103 0.112 0.104 0.110 
Notes: Statistical significance:* denotes statistically significant at the 1% level; ** denotes statistically 
significant at the 5% level; and  *** denotes statistically significant at the 10% level (according to the bootstrap 
confidence intervals). The α-% lower and upper bounds of confidence intervals represent a range within which 
the (100-α) percentile of bootstrapped coefficients lies. A bank is classified as “small” if its total customer 
deposits are less than IDR 500,000 tn., “medium” if total deposits range between IDR 500,000 tn. and 
10,000,000 tn., and “large” if total deposits exceed  IDR 10,000,000 tn. 
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Table 10 
Results of the truncated regression with two truncations: SORM SBM input-oriented 
efficiency measures (Model 2 – equity capital as a proxy for risk) 
Bounds of the Bootstrap Est.  Confidence Intervals  
Est. Coef. 5% low 5% up 1% low 1% up 10% low 10% up 
Listed 0.035* 0.018 0.052 0.012 0.057 0.020 0.049 
Islamic -0.032*** -0.066 0.002 -0.077 0.013 -0.060 -0.002 
Foreign 
Exchange -0.173* -0.202 -0.142 -0.211 -0.133 -0.197 -0.147 
Non-
Foreign 
Exchange 
-0.130* -0.162 -0.096 -0.173 -0.086 -0.157 -0.102 
Regional 
Government 
Owned 
-0.222* -0.253 -0.190 -0.262 -0.180 -0.247 -0.195 
Joint-
Venture -0.060* -0.092 -0.027 -0.102 -0.017 -0.087 -0.032 
Foreign 0.034** 0.001 0.067 -0.009 0.077 0.006 0.061 
Small  -0.015*** -0.030 0.0004 -0.035 0.005 -0.028 -0.002 
Large -0.004 -0.0216 0.013 -0.027 0.019 -0.018 0.010 
Constant 0.615* 0.585 0.644 0.575 0.654 0.589 0.640 
εσˆ  0.115* 0.111 0.118 0.110 0.119 0.111 0.118 
Notes: Statistical significance:* denotes statistically significant at the 1% level; ** denotes statistically 
significant at the 5% level; and  *** denotes statistically significant at the 10% level (according to the bootstrap 
confidence intervals). The α-% lower and upper bounds of confidence intervals represent a range within which 
the (100-α) percentile of bootstrapped coefficients lies. A bank is classified as “small” if its total customer 
deposits are less than IDR 500,000 tn., “medium” if total deposits range between IDR 500,000 tn. and 
10,000,000 tn., and “large” if total deposits exceed  IDR 10,000,000 tn. 
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Figure 1. 
The share of total customer deposits held by Indonesian banks (by ownership of banks) 
as at 01.01.2008 
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Figure 2. 
Sensitivity of Results to the Choice of Modelling Methodologies (SORM SBM or RD) and to the Choice of Risk Control Variables 
(loan loss provisions (LLP) or Equity Capital (EC)). 
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Figure 3. 
Distributions of Indonesian Banking Efficiency Scores Across the Modelling Methodologies: Annual Comparisons Using Kernel Density 
Analysis. 
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Figure 4. 
Distributions of Indonesian Banking Efficiency Scores Across the Modelling Methodologies: Comparison Using Kernel Inter-Density 
Mobility Analysis. 
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